Posted: July 23, 2026
Rules of Civil Procedure – Comment Period Closes September 8, 2026
URCP005. Service and filing of pleadings and other documents. AMEND. The amendments require a party seeking default judgment to serve notice on a non-moving party’s attorney if known, even if no formal appearance has been entered. Additionally, they expand service requirements on defaulting parties to mandate serving the proposed default judgment along with all accompanying and supporting documents.
URCP029.Stipulations regarding disclosure and discovery procedure. AMEND. This amendment corrects a typographical error by updating a cross-reference from Rule 26(b)(2) to Rule 26(b)(3) regarding proportionality standards.
URCP030. Depositions upon oral questions. AMEND. The amendments to paragraph (f) remove outmoded requirements for deposition officers to physically seal and label transcripts with specific markings, streamlining delivery requirements to reflect modern practice and eliminate unnecessary costs.
URCP037. Statement of discovery issues; Sanctions; Failure to admit, to attend deposition or to preserve evidence. AMEND. The amendments align paragraph (a)(2) with Rule 7(q) by adding a 1,500-word limit option for statements of discovery issues, and update a cross-reference in paragraph (a)(7) from Rule 26(b)(2) to Rule 26(b)(3) regarding proportionality standards.
URCP064. Writs in general. AMEND. The amendments to paragraph (d)(2) align the rule with S.B. 156 by explicitly permitting writs to direct an officer to establish a periodic payment schedule with a defendant in lieu of seizing and selling property, or to communicate with the defendant regarding payment of the writ.
URCP064E. Writ of execution. AMEND. The amendment to paragraph (a) aligns the rule with S.B. 156 by clarifying that a writ of execution is available to enforce a judgment or order for the payment of money whether the payment is in an amount sufficient to satisfy the final judgment or subject to a periodic payment schedule.
URCP074. Withdrawal of counsel. AMEND. The amendment to paragraph (e) removes the requirement for former counsel’s signature on a notice of substitution of counsel, ensuring that obtaining former counsel’s signature or permission is not a prerequisite for a client to secure new representation.
URCP0105. Shortening 30 day waiting period in divorce actions. AMEND. The amendments replace references to a “motion for a hearing” with a “request to enter a decree of divorce” to reflect the modern practice of submitting stipulated proposed findings rather than holding actual hearings, alongside minor plain-language and stylistic updates.
URCP110. Judicial interview of a minor child. NEW. This new rule applies to district court proceedings in which the court is permitted to interview a minor child, and explicitly excludes juvenile court matters, child testimony, and non-judicial interviews. Adapted generally from the Uniform Judicial Interview of Children Act (UJICA), the rule covers interview criteria, required judicial training, recording requirements, guardian ad litem attendance, and post-interview access to records.
Proposed Rule 5 modifies the requirement to serve a notice of default judgment but preserves an uncertainty that has existed regarding that service: if an attorney appears in an action and the court later enters a judgment, must the Rule 58A notice of entry of judgment be served only on the attorney as required by Rule 5(b)(1), or should service also be made on the party?
I recommend that Rule 5(b)(1) be modified to require that any Rule 58A notice of judgment be served on both the attorney and the party. Too often, especially with default judgments, the judgment is entered as a result of a mistake or neglect by the attorney. The client should be notified directly of any judgment so that the attorney cannot hide the mistake.
I believe Rule 110 is an important addition to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It gives children a more direct voice with judicial decision-makers, rather than having that voice potentially diluted or distorted by the many adults involved in the process, including parents, attorneys, therapists, and guardians ad litem. Meeting directly with a child—when warranted—can also remind judges and commissioners of the human realities of the proceedings, putting a name and a face to the case before them.
That said, I have serious reservations about paragraph (c)(5) and its implications in cases involving abuse.
CONFIDENTIALITY CAN BE VETOED BY AN ABUSIVE PARENT
As currently written, paragraph (c)(5) provides that:
– the default arrangement is that both parents may obtain access to the recording of the child’s interview; and
– to opt out of that access, both parents must stipulate to such.
This effectively gives an abusive parent the ability to veto the confidentiality of the child’s disclosures. And considering that the child will be told “whether the interview record will be provided to the parties” under paragraph (c)(6)(E), if the child is told an abusive parent may later access the recording, the child will be less likely to speak freely about their experiences. For an abused child, the interview may feel much the same as if their abuser were standing in the corner of the room. (For purposes of this comment, I use the term “abuse” broadly to include related factors identified in Utah Code § 81-9-204(4), such as coercive control and psychological maltreatment.)
A better approach would be one in which the default arrangement is that *neither* parent may obtain access to the recording unless they *both* stipulate to that access. This would allow a protective parent to protect the confidentiality of the interview rather than allowing an abusive parent to compel access to it.
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DUE PROCESS CAN COEXIST
This approach remains consistent with paragraph (d)(2), which requires the disclosure of contested factual allegations and preserves the parties’ opportunity to respond—an appropriate and necessary safeguard.
In fact, paragraph (d)(2) already points toward how to strike the right balance. The interview itself could remain confidential by default, while children are clearly informed that certain categories of information may nevertheless be disclosed. Therapists routinely explain confidentiality in a similar way—for example, by telling a child that most of what they say will stay between them, but there are a few situations where it may need to be shared to help keep the child safe. Children understand those boundaries, and that understanding often makes honest disclosure possible because they know exactly what will—and will not—remain confidential.
A similar approach here would better protect abused children while preserving the due process rights of parents to respond to factual allegations that could affect the outcome of the case.
Comments on Proposed Amendments to Rules 64 and 64E
The amendments proposed would codify the abusive practice of constables misusing writs of execution to pressure debtors for installment payments instead of performing the court directed and supervised seizure and sale process. As a consumer protection litigation attorney with more than 23 years of experience, I therefore oppose the proposed changes to Rules 64 and 64E.
Rules 64 and 64E exist to ensure that judgments are enforced through an official, impartial judicial process subject to court supervision, not through a private collection arrangement controlled by the person who benefits from obtaining payment. Under that process, the debtor receives notice of exemptions, an opportunity to object and be heard, and the constable must report an inventory of any seizures and proceeds of property sales to the court. The proposed amendments subvert those safeguards and convert the execution process into ongoing debt collection administered by constables without judicial oversight. This Court should reject those amendments or at least clarify their scope as suggested below.
This concern is not hypothetical. Utah’s execution process has already been the subject of repeated litigation challenging the way writs of execution have been misused by constables to obtain installment payments from judgment debtors. In that litigation, constables testified under oath that their payment collection process exists to avoid executing writs of execution. To that end, those constables sent letters to debtors threatening to seize and sell their property at a specified date, time, and location with no intention of ever carrying out those sales. Rather than taking action stop these abuses of the judicial process, the Legislature has now authorized constables to administer periodic payment arrangements. The proposed amendments to Rules 64 and 64E would now incorporate that practice into the Rules of Civil Procedure without addressing the abuse that gave rise to the litigation.
The Rules of Civil Procedure govern how a writ is obtained, served, and returned. They do not define the scope of a constable’s official duties and they cannot expand or diminish the protections available to debtors under federal or state consumer protection laws. That distinction should be made clear in the Rules themselves. Without such language, the amendments invite the argument that any collection activity undertaken by a constable is authorized by this Court and therefore beyond the reach of the FDCPA and Utah’s consumer protection statutes. Rejecting the proposed changes or incorporating a simple savings clause would prevent that misunderstanding and would clarify that allowing constables to collect debt does not authorize them to violate state or federal consumer protection statutes. I propose language along the following lines:
“Nothing in these rules may be construed to make the acceptance or administration of periodic payments part of the judicial execution process or an official duty of a constable, or as affecting the applicability of any federal or state law governing debt collection activity.”
The power of the State exists to enforce lawful judgments, not to facilitate private collection arrangements. A writ of execution is a command from the court to seize and sell a debtor’s property under strict judicial procedures and oversight. The court’s orders are not, and should not be reduced to, a discretionary process the constable can wholly disregard, which is precisely what some constables have testified their payment collection process is designed to accomplish. When the execution process is used to pressure payment rather than enforce the court’s order, judicial oversight and neutrality are replaced by a private collection arrangement where the constable’s financial interest is aligned with obtaining payment rather than simply carrying out the court’s command.
Courts entrust constables with significant authority because they are expected to exercise that authority as neutral officers of the court, not as interested participants who leverage the credibility of their office for a financial stake in the outcome. When a constable’s compensation depends upon administering long-term payment arrangements, the constable acquires a financial interest that differs materially from the traditional role of neutrally executing a writ and returning it to the court. The authority of public office should not be used as a means of generating private income. Indeed, while constables are now allowed to collect periodic payments, Utah Code § 76-8-110 paradoxically prohibits police officers from collecting debts for compensation or from holding a financial interest in a debt collection agency.
The Court should reject the proposed amendments. They would transform the execution process from a neutral judicial procedure into an ongoing debt collection system administered by constables for their own financial benefit, while removing the judicial oversight and protections the Rules were designed to provide. If the Court nevertheless adopts any portion of the proposal, the Rules should expressly state that making payment arrangements does not replace the judicial procedures governing execution of a writ, expand the official duties of a constable, or create any exception to applicable federal or state laws governing debt collection.
The addition of a requirement in Rule 5(a)(2)(B)(ii) to serve under Rule 4 is unnecessary and unduly burdensome on the plaintiff/judgment creditor because it requires more work/effort than even to renew a judgment under Rule 58C. If a motion under Rule 58C is not required to be served under Rule 4, why would a motion to modify or augment the judgment be required to be served under Rule 4. Once a party has been summoned to appear, it should not be incumbent upon the plaintiff/judgment creditor to effectively summon the defendant/judgment debtor anew, and if a defendant/judgment debtor fails to keep the court and the plaintiff/judgment creditor apprised of his/her contact information, it should not fall upon the plaintiff/judgment creditor to effectively do that job. Furthermore, it will only increase costs of litigation and, ultimately, increase the amounts the defendant/judgment debtor will have to pay. This does not seem like a prudent or reasonable requirement to impose upon plaintiffs/judgment creditors; otherwise the same logic can be applied to virtually anything that is filed with the court, including motions for summary judgment, or even simply motions for an award of attorney’s fees.
Thus, I suggest that the language to be added regarding motions to modify or augment default judgments not be adopted.
The proposed Rule 5 changes require that in the case of an application for a default judgment that an unrepresented party be served with the default judgment papers via first- class mail and does not give an avenue for service upon these individuals via email. As a high-volume creditor’s rights filer, these comments are offered from that perspective.
Forcing creditors to first-class mail these default judgment papers imposes an additional cost without an identified corresponding benefit. Most creditors would welcome additional contact from their defendants, but at this stage the defendants have largely already decided to not actively participate in the process. While the cost of one mailing may seem insignificant, multiplied across hundreds or thousands over the course of the year adds up.
Rule amendments should only impose additional requirements where there is a demonstrated corresponding benefit to the litigants or the process as a whole. Reaching out to known attorneys as proposed in this rule update appears to fulfill both prongs as when the defendant has an attorney the defendant is engaged in the process and receives a direct benefit from the representation. By contrast, there does not appear to be a comparable benefit to first-class mailing default judgment papers to parties who have not participated in the litigation process despite prior notice.
Furthermore, in today’s world email is as likely to reach and be read by a defendant as first-class mail. Creditors generally have the defendant’s email address either as a result of a prior business relationship or as otherwise used by the defendant to communicate with the creditor regarding the defendant’s account. Email is routine and, in many instances, may be more likely to be reviewed promptly than traditional mail.
It is my suggestion that in debt collection cases that there be an option for the serving party to email the default judgment papers to the last known email address on file with the creditor instead of having to send the default judgment papers via first-class mail. Additionally, I would suggest that the portion of the rule dealing with serving attorney’s licensed out of state be modified to allow for service to either the attorney’s preferred email address or the email address on file with the attorney licensing entity in the state where the attorney is licensed.
Below is a suggested edit.
(B) Email. If the party serving or being served a document does not have an
electronic filing account:
i) In the case of a debt collection case and the email address has been provided as part of the transaction related to the matter, emailing it to the most recent email address on file with the creditor, the most recent email address provided to the court as provided in Rule 10 or Rule 76 or;
ii) In all other cases where the person being served has provided to the court an email address as provided in Rule 10 or Rule 76 email it to that address; or
iii) if service is to an attorney licensed in Utah, to the email address on the attorney’s most recent filing or on file with the Utah State Bar; or
iv) if service is to an attorney not licensed in Utah, to the email address on the attorney’s most recent filing, the preferred email address of the attorney provided to the serving party, or the email address on file with the attorney licensing entity in the state where the attorney is licensed.