Posted: March 11, 2025
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure – Comment Period Closed April 25, 2025
URCP026.4. Provisions governing disclosure and discovery in contested proceedings under titles 75, 75A, or 75B of the Utah Code. AMEND. This rule was previously amended to reflect the recodification of the probate code to reference additional Utah Code titles, as well as, to conform to the style guide for the rules. These additional amendments clarify the information that needs to be provided regarding any less restrictive alternatives to guardianship or conservatorship.
URCP101. Motion practice before court commissioners. AMEND. Proposed amendments to clarify scope, content, oral motions, service on unrepresented parties, exhibits and admissible evidence, page limits, hearings and orders.
URCP 101. Exhibits should be unlimited in length and not be counted as part of the page limits, like Rule 7. Also, it should be clear that signature pages, bilingual notices, and certificates of service, and summary charts are not included in the page limits.
“Exhibits should be unlimited in length and not be counted as part of the page limits, like Rule 7.” AGREED. Why is this different under Rule 101 than 7?
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(b): and requesting that the committee also readdress: “Any evidence necessary to support the moving party’s position must be presented by affidavit, declaration, or other admissible evidence. The motion may also include a supporting memorandum.”
While the committee’s revisions in Rule 101 clarify that evidence must be presented in a proper form, the rule still leaves ambiguity regarding the growing practice of filing “verified” motions—motions that include factual statements within the body of the motion itself, followed by a client’s declaration or verification statement at the end, so as to avoid a separate declaration or affidavit.
Concerns with the Rule wording-
1. Unclear Whether Verified Motions Are Permissible
o The rule does not explicitly state whether a party may submit a verified motion instead of attaching a separate affidavit or declaration.
o If verified motions are acceptable, the rule should state so explicitly to avoid inconsistent application among commissioners.
o If verified motions are not acceptable, the rule should make clear that the motion itself should only request relief, and that all factual allegations must be contained in separate affidavits or declarations.
2. Confusion Stemming From the Phrase “The Motion May Also Include a Supporting Memorandum”
o Because the rule allows a memorandum to be included in the motion, attorneys have blended factual assertions into motions rather than keeping them in separate supporting documents. While this practice has allowed attorneys to reduce the number of pages, it has also led to sloppier motion practice and inconsistencies in formatting, with requested relief intermingled with factual assertions and spread throughout the motion.
o If the intended structure is for a motion to only request relief and for factual content to be separately submitted, the rule should state so and prohibit this practice.
Proposed Solutions: If we are going to follow Rule 7 formatting, then let’s do it, but if not, then more direction is required, like Rule 7 has.
1. If Verified Motions Are Permissible:
o The rule should state explicitly that a motion may contain verified factual statements.
o This would codify current practice and prevent unnecessary disputes about whether a separate affidavit or declaration is required.
2. If Verified Motions Are Not Permissible:
o The rule should explicitly require that a motion contain only the requested relief, and that:
All factual statements must be contained in separate affidavits or declarations.
The memorandum is a separate document from the motion and cannot be merged into it.
o This would eliminate loopholes that allow attorneys to introduce factual assertions directly in motions under the guise of a combined memorandum.
Conclusion:
Because current practice has allowed verified motions to be used inconsistently, Rule 101(b) should be further clarified to either:
1. Explicitly allow verified motions as an alternative to separate affidavits/declarations, or
2. Require that all factual assertions be presented separately, making clear that the motion itself is limited to requested relief and that memoranda cannot be merged into the motion.
For these reasons, I recommend that Rule 101(b) be further refined to eliminate ambiguity and ensure uniform application.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
I would like to add one more comment regarding my earlier point about “inconsistencies in formatting, with requested relief intermingled with factual assertions and spread throughout the motion.” This lack of structure makes it difficult to clearly identify all the relief being requested.
Unlike Rule 7(c)(6)—which requires that a motion clearly state the relief requested under an appropriate heading and in a specific order—there is no similar requirement in Rule 101 if verified motions are going to be allowed. As a result, when attorneys intermingle facts with requested relief throughout a verified motion, it can be difficult to determine exactly what relief is being sought, particularly at a glance.
In practice, this often forces opposing counsel (and likely commissioners as well) to hunt through the verified motion, sometimes even using different-colored highlighters, just to identify all the relief being requested. This lack of structural clarity can lead to confusion, delays, and inefficiencies in motion practice.
I would like to add to JB’s comment about formatting issues and lack of headings. I have a very similar concern:
1. The Lack of a Designation Assigning the Document to the Party is confounding the confusion of what is and what is not properly before the court. Motions are being heard out of order. Motions are being filed and propelled through court process prior to motions that are properly before the court and which have a direct effect on the motions missed.
a. This confusion has perpetuated the abuse and intentional misleading of Commissioners by unethical parties that do not bring the error to the attention of the court. Even then, Commissioners so greatly rely on the record and the short heading on the docket, they disregard and ignore the honest party.
b.The designation of Petitioner/Plaintiff and Defendant/Respondent must be provided in front of the pleading that belongs to that party. i.e. Petitioner’s Petition to Modify Divorce Decree, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s Petition to Modify Divorce Decree.
The confusion due to the lack thereof, is insurmountable. It is a simple requirement and would greatly ease the confusion to the court and to the parties on how to respond, who is the moving party and who is not, what will actually be heard and at what hearing. More often that not, there are Petitions to Modify submitted by both parties and Motions to Enforce by both parties, but there is no easy way to determine what is what and whose is whose.
REAL EXAMPLE: Respondent filed a Motion for Temporary Orders. Petitioner Filed a Motion to Dismiss the Motion for Temporary Orders. Petitioner files a Motion to Enforce. Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss the Motion to Enforce. the court is so confused by the motions that Petitioner voluntarily withdraws her Motion to Enforce and Respondent stipulates so. Respondent then files an Opposition to Petitioner’s WITHDRAWN motions and the court is hearing them PRIOR to the Motion for Temporary Orders OR the Motion to Dismiss! Why? Because both parties have submitted Petitions to Modify and the court is Mistitling Motions.
Now, before the court, Petitioner has had to file a Motion to Correct the Record.
The lack of clarity has gotten way out of hand. It has done more than just lead to confusion, delays and inefficiences. It has perpetuated abusive practices by unethical parties, has increased expenses and resources exponentially and effectively made Commissioners incapable of performing their duties effectively and efficiently.
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(d). I strongly oppose the proposed change requiring that, if the nonmoving party is unrepresented and has not filed or served a document within the last 120 days, service must be made under Rule 4 instead of Rule 5. The amendment would have significant negative consequences for litigants, attorneys, and the Court. Below are only a few of the several reasons why this rule should not be changed:
1. Increased Costs – Rule 4 mandates personal service, which is significantly more expensive than service permitted under Rule 5 (e.g., email or mail). Parties will be forced to hire process servers or take additional steps to comply with formal service requirements, increasing the financial burden on litigants. If personal service cannot be effectuated, alternative service motions will be required, further driving up costs.
2. Procedural Delays – The stricter service requirements will likely result in substantial delays, particularly when personal service proves difficult. The need to file motions for alternative service and obtain Court approval will create unnecessary procedural hurdles, slowing down case resolution.
3. Burden on the Courts – The increased volume of motions for alternative service will place an additional burden on court resources. Instead of focusing on substantive legal issues, the courts will see increased litigation over service-related motions that were previously unnecessary under Rule 5.
4. Creates an Arbitrary and Unworkable Cutoff – The proposed 120-day threshold is an arbitrary limitation that does not account for practical realities. Many parties may still be actively engaged in a case despite not filing a document within that timeframe. In complex cases, particularly those involving extensive fact discovery and/or expert discovery, or long periods between hearings, it is not uncommon for 120 days to pass without a filing—especially if a custody evaluation is ongoing with a Rule 4-903 conference scheduled thereafter. The rule unfairly presumes that a party is unreachable based on an arbitrary period of inactivity.
Furthermore, this rule places an unworkable burden on attorneys and the courts by requiring constant tracking of whether 120 days have passed since the opposing party last filed something. Pro se litigants rarely file or serve documents, meaning that every four months, the “reset button” would be triggered, forcing service under Rule 4 again. This is not only costly but creates an administrative nightmare for attorneys who must repeatedly monitor the clock and seek expensive personal service when unnecessary. This places an unfair financial burden on represented parties, forcing them to pay more in fees simply because the opposing party has chosen to remain inactive. It also increases the court’s burden in enforcing this tracking requirement across filings.
Additionally, if service under Rule 5 is deemed unreliable after 120 days for attorneys and litigants, it raises the question of why the same reasoning would not apply to the Court’s own notices. Consistency in procedural requirements should be a guiding principle in rule amendments.
5. Encourages Gamesmanship – The rule change may incentivize parties to strategically avoid filing anything for 120 days to force their opponent into the more costly and cumbersome Rule 4 service process. This could be exploited to create unnecessary expense and delay in litigation.
6. Disrupts Established Practice – For years, attorneys and parties have relied on the efficiency of Rule 5 service in post-judgment proceedings and motion practice. This proposed change would unnecessarily disrupt well-established legal procedures without a compelling justification.
7. Unnecessary in Light of Electronic Filing – With the widespread use of electronic case filing and management systems, there is no reasonable justification for requiring such formalistic, time consuming, and costly service requirements. The judiciary has made significant progress in modernizing service methods, and this change would represent a step backward.
A more appropriate and fair solution would be to require pro se litigants to maintain an e-filing account or, at minimum, provide and keep an active email address on record for service. In fact, their attorney, when filing their notice of withdraw as legal counsel, they should be required to not only provide the client’s latest mailing address, but also their email address. Attorneys are already required to e-file and maintain a valid email for service—there is no compelling reason why pro se litigants should not have similar obligations.
If the concern behind this amendment is ensuring litigants receive notice, requiring pro se parties to maintain and monitor an email address would be a far more efficient and cost-effective approach than unfairly shifting the burden onto the represented party to serve under Rule 4. This would allow unrepresented parties to continue benefiting from the simplicity of Rule 5 service while ensuring that represented litigants are not forced into costly, cumbersome personal service simply because the opposing party has not recently filed a document.
8. Existing Rules Already Require Parties to Keep Contact Information Updated – Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, litigants are already required to keep their addresses (and in many cases, their email addresses) up to date with the court. This ensures that service under Rule 5 remains effective. If a party fails to update their contact information, that is their responsibility. The existing requirement eliminates the need for this burdensome amendment.
9. The Amendment Contradicts Access to Justice Goals – There has been ongoing discussion among policymakers and the judiciary about the high cost of legal services, particularly in family law cases. However, rule changes such as this one contradict efforts to improve access to justice. If adopted, this rule will unnecessarily increase costs and complexity for litigants.
10. No Clear Justification for the Change – The proposed amendment appears to solve a problem that does not exist. What evidence is there that service under Rule 5 is failing? If data exists demonstrating a pattern of service failures, it would be beneficial for that information to be made available for review. As a practicing attorney for over 22 years, I cannot recall the last time someone claimed they did not receive a motion. If a service issue ever arises, Rule 60(b) is the appropriate remedy—something all attorneys understand, and thus, they are already careful to ensure that their motions are properly served.
Furthermore, if the premise of this amendment is that service under Rule 5 becomes unreliable after 120 days, a broader review of related rules, such as Rule 7 and Rule 5 itself, may be necessary to ensure consistency. Should those rules also be amended to comport with this new philosophy? If not, why does this logic apply to Rule 101(d) but not to other procedural rules?
11. Disparate Treatment of Represented and Unrepresented Parties – The proposed amendment creates an unfair discrepancy between represented and unrepresented parties regarding service methods. Under this rule, an unrepresented party must be served under Rule 4 unless they have recently participated in the case, while a represented party may still be served through their attorney under Rule 5. This introduces unnecessary confusion and, more importantly, an imbalance in procedural fairness.
Again, rather than imposing Rule 4 service requirements on represented parties, a more logical and consistent approach would be to require pro se litigants to maintain an e-filing account or an active email for service. Attorneys have long been subject to electronic service requirements, and it is reasonable to expect unrepresented litigants to take similar steps to ensure they receive notices. If a party should elect to receive notice via mail instead of email, that is fine, but again, they should be held accountable for their choice and maintain an up-to-date mailing address with the court.
12. Unrepresented parties will benefit from more efficient service under Rule 5, while represented litigants will face costly, cumbersome personal service requirements if the unrepresented party becomes inactive in the case. If the justification for this rule is that service under Rule 5 is unreliable after 120 days, then why should represented parties be subject to different standards? This creates a fundamental fairness issue that the Court and Committee should carefully consider.
13. Post-Decree Matters Such as QDROs Will Be Unnecessarily Burdened – This amendment would have a significant impact on routine post-divorce filings such as Motions for Entry of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) (as well as other motions, such as motions to relocate, motions to challenge decision-making authority in parenting plans, etc.). Many QDROs are filed months after a divorce is finalized, and there could have easily been more than 120 days from the date the pro se litigant last filed anything with the court. As such, this rule would dramatically increase the cost of obtaining QDROs (and similar post-decree relief). The Court should not impose an additional financial and procedural hurdle on litigants attempting to complete a necessary step in their case.
For the above reasons, I strongly urge the Court to reject the proposed amendment to Rule 101(d) and retain the existing language allowing for service under Rule 5.
Thank you for your consideration.
As a pro se litigant, I completely agree.
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(g) and to request that the committee also address related concerns within the rule that: “A counter motion need not be limited to the subject matter of the original motion… A separate notice of hearing on a counter motion is not required.”
While this provision may have been intended to promote efficiency, in practice, it creates serious procedural and fairness concerns that should be addressed.
Concerns With Allowing Unrelated Countermotions in the Same Hearing Slot –
1. Unrelated Countermotions Can Create Procedural Chaos
o Allowing a party to file any counter motion—regardless of its subject matter—within the same hearing slot can undermine the fairness of motion practice. Example: A party files a motion to appoint a custody evaluator, and the opposing party counters with a motion for temporary orders—a vastly broader and more complex issue.
o These unrelated matters should not be forced into the same hearing, as they involve different legal and factual analyses.
2. Unfair Impact of the 25-Page Limitation
o Under the proposed rules, the 25-page limit applies to all motions heard within the same hearing slot, including counter motions. This creates a severe disadvantage for the original moving party, who may have already used a substantial portion of the 25-page limit addressing their original motion. If the opposing party files a complex counter motion, such as a motion for temporary orders, the moving party may be severely restricted in their ability to respond due to the page limit. This is procedurally unfair and could prevent the court from receiving the full scope of information needed to make a well-informed decision.
3. Potential for Strategic Abuse of Countermotions
o As written, the rule invites gamesmanship, where a party could intentionally file a broad counter motion in response to a narrowly focused motion, knowing that the original moving party will be limited in their response.
o This tactic could be used to overwhelm an opposing party, limit their ability to respond, and shift the focus away from the original motion.
o The result could be one-sided hearings where one party is effectively denied a fair opportunity to argue their case.
Proposed Solutions:
1. Require Countermotions to Be Related to the Subject Matter of the Original Motion
o The rule should state that a counter motion must relate to the same general subject matter as the original motion.
o This would prevent unrelated motions from being forced into the same hearing slot without proper notice or preparation.
2. Allow Separate Notices of Hearing for Certain Countermotions
o If a counter motion raises a substantially different issue than the original motion, a separate notice of hearing should be required unless both parties stipulate to have them heard together.
o This would allow the court to schedule hearings more effectively and ensure that both parties have sufficient time and page space to address the issues properly.
3. Adjust the 25-Page Limit to Account for Countermotions
o If counter motions are to remain unrestricted in subject matter, then the 25-page limit must be adjusted to prevent unfair restrictions on responses.
o Possible solutions include:
Allowing each party 25 pages per motion (rather than per hearing).
Requiring the responding party to allocate additional pages for counter motion responses.
4. Prevent Strategic Abuse of Countermotions
o The rule should include language to prevent bad-faith counter motions that are designed to sideline or overwhelm the original motion.
o Commissioners should have discretion to defer unrelated counter motions to separate hearings if they determine that combining them would be unfair or inefficient.
For these reasons, I request that the committee modify Rule 101(g) to close these procedural loopholes and ensure fair motion practice.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(g) and to request that the committee also address related concerns within the rule that: “A counter motion need not be limited to the subject matter of the original motion… A separate notice of hearing on a counter motion is not required.”
While this provision may have been intended to promote efficiency, in practice, it creates serious procedural and fairness concerns that should be addressed.
1. Allowing Pleading of New Matters In Countermotions Prejudices Parties – when new matters are submitted via Countermotion within a Reply Memo or Response, the hearing that was originally scheduled to hear only those matters plead in the original motion is now not enough time for a full opportunity to be heard on the new matters.
It also allows parties to sideline the original motion, overshadow the serious matters with less serious ones and overwhelm the last responding party in the process to have less time to prepare for the upcoming hearing, sometimes leaving only 3 days before the hearing to respond to the countermotion and permitting more rampant strategic abuse of the system by attorneys well versed in the law at the expense of unrepresented parties.
i.e. Real Example: Petitioner files a very simple Motion to Compel Production of Documents on 03-03-25. Hearing was set for 03-17-25. Respondent answers in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion on 03-10-25 and includes a Countermotion to Deem Litigant Vexatious. An answer to the Countermotion AND ANY reply to Respondent’s Opposition is due IN LESS THAN 7 DAYS because that’s when the hearing is scheduled and both matters are allowed to be heard at the hearing. In addition, Respondent has performed the same for two other Motions scheduled for hearing on 03-17-25 and 03-19-25. They were all served on Petitioner on 03-10-25.
How is this not an instruction manual on how to harass the opposing party?
2. Furthermore, if “bad faith” is the determining factor whether a party is filing frivolous motions or pleadings, because of this loophole, bad faith can be rebutted by simply saying procedure was followed.
For this reason, I request that countermotions must be filed separately, treated separately procedurally if they contain separate matters, that they should be Titled as a new motion because they really aren’t “countering” anything.
3. The 25-page limit Impermissibly Restricts Responses and Original Motions
a. While restricting the response of the body of the motions to a 25-page limit does not seem possible in complex cases, but even in simple cases that involve only one issue, it is nearly impossible to constrain to the page limit. If there has to be a section for Relief Sought, Statement of Facts, Argument, Prayer for Relief and the only issue covers a substantial part of calendar years, 25-pages is factually and mathematically impossible.
b. The inability to present the entire history or relevant, important and admissible facts violates due process and inhibits the ability for a party to adequately represent themselves. In addition, by requiring only summaries of the voluminous exhibits may not be feasible is some situations.
REAL EXAMPLE: Petitioner has been advised by Commissioners and Judges to bring Motions to Enforce contradictorily by one of them wanting Petitioner to file more often and one of them wanting Petitioner to file less often. Petitioner restricts her Motion to Enforce for Unreimbursed Expenses to one year of unreimbursed receipts and it exceeds the 25-page limit. A motion to submit an Overlength Memorandum was not allowed, so Petitioner compressed photos of receipts so more could fit on a page and then Respondent made an Objection to the Overlength Memorandum and Countermotion in Objection to the Exhibits themselves.
A page limit in any form violates Due Process policies. If counter motions are to remain unrestricted in subject matter, then the 25-page limit must be adjusted to prevent unfair restrictions on responses.
I agree wholeheartedly to JB’s suggestions.
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(k): “Each party may submit no more than 25 total pages per hearing regardless of the number of motions to be heard.”
I believe this change is necessary and beneficial, as some commissioners have interpreted the current rule to mean 25 pages per day, while others have applied it per motion. The per-day interpretation has caused unnecessary problems and inconsistencies, making scheduling more difficult than it needs to be. For example, if a party has at least one complex or highly contested motion, they are forced to schedule each motion on different days, even when the motions are interdependent. This means that a party may have to artificially separate their filings, dividing the 25-page limit across different motions, even though all the motions should be heard in sequential order, one after the other, in the same day. This disrupts efficiency, increases delays, and forces courts to hear related motions piecemeal rather than resolving them efficiently.
Furthermore, this increases costs for the parties, as they are required to return to court on separate days when their motions could have been heard back-to-back in the same day. This places an unnecessary financial and logistical burden on litigants.
If the court has multiple hearing slots available in a day, and each slot allows 25 pages per hearing, then why should it matter if the same parties take up two slots for their own motions? The total number of pages submitted to the court remains the same, regardless of whether different parties fill the slots or the same parties do. If a party is entitled to 25 pages per motion hearing, then they should be able to file accordingly, without being penalized simply because they have multiple motions set for the same day.
By clarifying that the 25-page limit applies per hearing, the rule promotes efficiency and ensures fairness in scheduling.
However, I am concerned that a commissioner may again interpret the rule in such a way as to force parties back to the “per day” idea and/or require that all motions filed by a party be contained within a single hearing. To prevent future misinterpretation, the rule should explicitly state that a party may schedule multiple motions on the same day, in different hearing slots, and that the 25-page limit applies separately to each hearing slot.
To eliminate ambiguity, I suggest that the rule explicitly state:
“A party may schedule multiple motions for separate hearings, even on the same day, and the 25-page limit applies separately to each hearing.”
Adding this clarification would remove any doubt and ensure that the rule is applied consistently across all commissioners.
For these reasons, I support the amendment to Rule 101(k), with a further clarification to avoid potential misinterpretation.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
I am writing to provide comments regarding the proposed modification of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 101(o): “The following motions must be submitted to the judge to whom the case is assigned:”
I believe this list should also include any motion filed after the case has been certified for trial. It is inconsistent and inefficient for a commissioner to continue ruling on motions once a case has been certified for trial and assigned to a judge.
Concerns With Allowing Commissioners to Rule on Post-Certification Motions:
1. Lack of Judicial Consistency
o Once a case is certified for trial, the assigned judge is responsible for conducting the trial and managing all pretrial proceedings.
o While motions in limine are already included in the list, other motions filed after certification—such as motions to continue trial, discovery-related motions, or case management motions—may, under this rule, still go before a commissioner instead of the judge.
o If the judge is handling the trial, they should also be the one handling all pretrial motions after certification to ensure consistency.
2. Inefficiency & Potential for Duplicative Litigation
o If a commissioner issues a ruling that a party objects to, the motion may ultimately be reviewed by the judge anyway—resulting in unnecessary delays and duplicative litigation.
o This inefficiency could be avoided by requiring that all motions after certification be decided by the trial judge from the outset.
3. Post-Certification Case Management Should Be Handled by the Judge
o Motions filed after certification for trial often involve case management, scheduling, discovery disputes, and procedural issues that directly impact how the judge will conduct trial.
o If a judge is responsible for overseeing the trial, they should also have full control over all pretrial rulings to ensure smooth trial preparation.
4. Certification for Trial Should Be the Clear Dividing Line
o Once a case is certified for trial, all motions should be handled by the judge who will conduct the trial.
o This ensures judicial efficiency, avoids conflicting rulings, and allows for consistent case management.
Proposed Solution:
To address these concerns, Rule 101(m) should be modified to explicitly state that any motion filed after the case has been certified for trial must be submitted to the assigned judge.
For these reasons, I support modifying Rule 101(m) to clarify that all motions filed after certification for trial must be heard by the trial judge.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Rule 26.4
Lines 38-41 should only apply to cases where capacity is at issue or the level of capacity is at issue. This information is unnecessary if 2 children are fighting over who should be appointed, but agree on all issues related to incapacity. This will only increase costs, which in most cases will ultimately be borne by the incapacitated person’s estate.
Rule 101(j)(3) – Exhibits
If we are going to keep the 25 page limit – then we should allow more evidence to be summarized. I support those who previously commented that we should remove the 25 page limit for motions and follow Rule 7. However, if we keep the 25 page limit then the committee should remove this language in 101(j)(3): “Affidavits and declarations may not be summarized.”
A party’s affidavit and declaration may not be summarized, but affidavits and declarations from third parties should be allowed to be summarized.
I think with the technology of WebEx hearings now there needs to be some specificity on providing voluminous exhibits in the form of a binder for those hearings.