Rules of Evidence

Re: Rule 509. News Reporters.
I assume that this proposed rule is in response to the recent Washington D.C. case involving the Bush administration, ‘Scooter’ Libby, and the former CIA agent Valerie Plume.
The Rule seems unclear about the definition of a “Confidential source” (meaning the anonymous person who disclosed the information). The rule only defines “Confidential source information”. As described in (a)(2), the “Confidential source” could be construed as anyone or anything “likely to lead directly to the disclosure of the identity” of the anonymous protected person, which may include: the news reporter or the news agency, or almost anyone else.
Without a clear definition of exactly who the “Confidential source” is (which, as worded, may include the news reporter itself), the Rule as proposed creates a very broad privilege, which makes the news reporter the holder of the privilege (not only the “Confidential source”) on behalf of all parties concerned (the confidential source, the news agency, the personal representative of the confidential source, etc.).
To be clearer, the rule should define specifically who the “Confidential source” is, as well as identify the holder of the privilege.
I realize that at the end of subsection (c), the rule appears to make the the anonymous person the holder of the privilege, however, the proposed rule does not define or identify anonymous, protected person alone as the “Confidential source”.
Last, a the Rule adopts a very subjective standard, stating that one must show a “substantial need for that information which outweighs the interest of a continued free flow of information”, in order to have a court order a news reporter to disclose the identity of anonymous person who is the “Confidential source”. Under this rule, whether or not a court could or would order the disclosure of the identity of a “Confidential source” would depend entirely on the discretion of a judge, which will vary from court to court, and from case to case (depending on the facts of the case). The rule would have inconsistent application, and would not afford equal protection under the law.
News reporters should be treated like everyone else under the law; there should be no special privilege extended to them, above others. The arguments against alllowing such a privilege are similar to those arguments against allowing an “accountant-client” privilege. Most notably, it would promote reckless news reporting by removing public accountability for published information, because the privilege allows a news reporter to merely invoke the privilege, and refuse to disclose the source of information–even if the information was false.
The rule creates a double standard, where a news reporter may currently insist that it have access to all information in the interest of the public, but then, the news reporter can withold information (i.e., identity of sources) from the public under a cloak of privilege.
The rule as proposed would remove accountability of news reporters, and hinder the search for truth in our legal system.
The status quo is fine. No new special privilege for news reporters is necessary. In this instance (discussion of the news reporter’s privilege), the search for truth in the legal system outweighs confidentiality.

What is proposed here as Rule 0509 seems to be a rather convoluted way to protect news reporters whose job serves the publilc interest. Society wants reporters to reveal information provided by “inside” sources. Without adequate protections, such information will be slow to surface, if it ever does.
The absolute privilege outlined in this Rule for published information seems a step in the right direction, but the exceptions that are later inserted tend to undermine the very privilege the Rule seems designed to protect. Unpublished information, for example, is not protected, even though it may be published later.
I do not see why news reporters need an absolute privilege for everything they do. What they do need is a reasonable, consistent standard of source protection that ought to be managed by judges based on a totality of circumstances. Reporters should not be subject to prosecutorial fishing expeditions.
The standard developed by Judge Boyce that is used in a number of Utah courts is a more reasonable approach than this proposed Rule.

I am Dayle Jeffs. I am a member of the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence that issued the proposed Rule 509. Although a majority of the Committee voted to issue the proposed Rule for public comment, a substantial minority of Committee members, including myself, voted against the proposed Rule. The minority members of the Committee support adoption of an alternative version of the Rule 509 (the “Alternative Rule”) that codifies existing Utah case law and creates a qualified privilege applicable to confidential sources and unpublished information gathered by news reporters. We believe this approach reflects a more reasonable and sensible balance of the competing policy interests and is more consistent with the case law in this area as applied by local federal and state trial courts over the past two decades. The Committee voted overwhelmingly to forward both rules to the Utah Supreme Court so that the Court could choose which, if any, it wished to adopt. So that public and the bar may have a full and fair opportunity to comment on both the majority draft and the Alternative Rule, I am posting the following copies of the Alternative Rule and the Analysis of those supporting the Alternative Draft of Proposed Rule 509 (News Reporters Privilege).
Rule 509 – News Reporters Privilege
(Alternative Draft)
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
1. “News reporter” means a publisher, editor, reporter, author or other similar person gathering information for the primary purpose of disseminating news to the public, and any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, press association or wire service, radio station, television station, satellite broadcast, cable system or other organization with whom that person is connected.
2. “News Information” includes both confidential source information and unpublished news information. “Confidential source information” means the name or any other information likely to lead to the disclosure of the identity of a person who gives information to a news reporter, acting in the capacity of a reporter, with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. “Unpublished news information” means information, other than confidential source information, that is gathered by a news reporter but not disseminated to the public, including notes, drafts, outtakes, photographs, video or sound tapes, film or other data of whatever sort in any medium now known or hereafter devised.
(b) Privilege. A news reporter has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing news information, unless a court determines by a preponderance of the evidence, after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard by the news reporter:
1. that the entity or person seeking the information has made reasonable efforts to obtain the information from sources other than a news reporter and has been unsuccessful;
2. that the information sought is of certain relevance to an issue of substantial importance and goes to the heart of the matter; and
3. given the type of controversy, that the interests in compelling disclosure of the information outweigh the interests in protecting the free flow of information to the public.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the news reporter, the organization or entity on whose behalf the news reporter was acting, the confidential source, the news reporter’s or confidential source’s guardian or conservator, or the personal representative of a deceased news reporter or confidential source.
Analysis of Those Supporting the Alternative Draft
Of Proposed Rule 509 (News Reporter’s Privilege)
The undersigned members of the Utah Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence oppose the Committee’s proposed version of Rule 509 concerning a news reporter’s privilege. A news reporter’s privilege raises significant First Amendment issues concerning the free flow of information to the public and the role of an independent press in gathering and reporting such information. In light of the significance of these issues, and the divergent views among Committee members concerning the proper scope and application of such a privilege, the undersigned members respectfully submit this analysis endorsing a reporter’s privilege set forth in the alternative draft. This alternative rule proposes a qualified reporter’s privilege applicable to both confidential and non-confidential unpublished information that is gathered by a news reporter. For the reasons briefly summarized below, we believe this approach reflects a more reasonable and sensible balance of the competing policy interests and is more consistent with the law in this area as applied by local federal and state trial courts over the past several years.
1. Utah Should Adopt a Reporter’s Privilege Rule. We agree with the Committee majority that it is time for Utah to recognize a reporter’s privilege. Utah is one of only three states without a statutory shield law, state constitutional protection, or state appellate court recognition of a news reporter’s privilege. Although a news reporter’s privilege has been recognized by the federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the District of Utah, and several Utah trial court judges, the absence of a privilege codified by statute or the Utah Rules of Evidence has created uncertainty among law enforcement, the news media, and civil litigants about the scope and protection of the privilege in Utah. For these reasons, and to promote more clarity and uniformity in this area of the law, we support adoption of a reporter’s privilege rule.
2. A qualified reporter’s privilege rule is consistent with local case law and practice. The version of the alternative Rule that we endorse essentially codifies the qualified reporter’s privilege adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) and United States Magistrate Judge Ronald N. Boyce in Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat’l Corp., 24 Med. L. Rep. 211, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14760 (D. Utah July 2, 1996). Based upon information provided to the Committee by counsel for the Utah news media and Utah prosecutors, its appears that Utah trial courts have been applying the Silkwood/Bottomly qualified privilege test for at least the past 20 years to resolve challenges to subpoenas seeking information from news reporters. The flexible nature of the test makes it well-suited to balancing the sensitive First Amendment interests of journalists in protecting their sources and news gathering material (whether obtained under a promise of confidentiality or not) against the legitimate needs of litigants and the Court to obtain evidence for the proper administration of justice. Because the privilege is qualified, there is no need for the problematic list of categorical “exceptions” to the privilege contained in the majority proposal. We believe that the better approach is to give trial judges flexibility to weigh the interests at stake in each particular case, rather than trying to prospectively predict what those interests will be, and how they must invariably be weighed. In the event any of the interests served by the exceptions are implicated by a subpoena to a news reporter, those interests would be weighed by the trial court through application of the three-part test. In short, we believe the Silkwood/Bottomly test reflects a sensible and reasonable approach to this issue and should be codified.
3. The majority proposal provides no protection for confidential sources where the “leak” itself is alleged to be a tort or crime. The reporter’s privilege endorsed by the majority is subject to six categorical “exceptions” that substantially erode protection for confidential sources and unpublished information gathered by news reporters. Most notably, under the “witness” and “physical evidence” exceptions, a prosecutor could force a reporter to disclose the identity of a confidential source or documents received from the source simply by asserting that the source has leaked classified or protected information, arguably constituting a crime. Some of history’s most significant stories, such as the NSA domestic spying program, Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and Iron-Contra, have depended on confidential sources disclosing information that the government claimed was “classified”. Publishing these stories serves as a critical check on government misconduct and secrecy and allows the public to hold its elected officials accountable. The majority rule provides no protection for whistle-blowers and other government “leakers” in such cases, regardless of the substantial public interest in receiving such information. Providing at least qualified protection for such sources, as the alternative rule does, serves the First Amendment rationale for the privilege in ensuring the free flow information concerning matters of public interest, and gives trial judges the flexibility they need to weigh the specific interests in each case.
4. The privilege should include qualified protection for unpublished non-confidential newsgathering material. The majority proposal provides no protection for unpublished information that is gathered by a news reporter without a promise of confidentiality to a source. Based upon testimony received from representatives of the Utah news media, this material constitutes the vast majority of information maintained by reporters and news organizations and the vast majority of material that is sought by subpoenas to news organizations. We believe the public interest in protecting such journalistic material from the unfettered subpoena power of prosecutors and other litigants is sufficiently compelling that it should be encompassed within the scope of the privilege. Contrary to the view of the Committee majority, which characterizes the interest in protecting such journalistic material as solely “proprietary,” (see Advisory Committee Note), we view the interest as directly rooted in the First Amendment. Because the interest of the press in gathering and disseminating news and information to the public is an interest of constitutional magnitude, the duties and privileges of the press in responding to subpoenas for unpublished information should not be the same as insurance companies and other civil litigants. Providing a qualified privilege for such material strikes a reasonable balance of the competing interests. It also is consistent with the policy choice made by nearly every other state, including most recently Connecticut, that has enacted a reporter’s privilege law. The majority proposal would make Utah an extreme outlier in this area of the law and would be unwise as a matter of public policy.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully submit the attached alternative proposal to the Court for its review and consideration.
Respectfully,
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq. Clark Waddoups, Esq.
Thomas W. Seiler, Esq. Thomas D. Roberts, Esq.

While I am confident the Advisory Committee made sincere and diligent efforts to arrive at what it considered a good draft of Rule 509, I am surprised and extremely disappointed in the result reflected in the majority draft. In my view, it would be a grave mistake for the Court to adopt the proposal in the majority draft. Based on my study, the majority draft would give Utah a very unusual and likely unworkable version of reporter’s privilege. I believe the majority draft carries potential for great harm to those who most need the protection of a strong yet reasonable privilege – not just journalists but the citizens of Utah. The adoption of the majority draft would not provide clarity to Utah lawyers, judges and journalists. In fact, I believe the opposite is more likely: The majority draft would exacerbate current confusion and would likely have to be revisited through amendments in the very near future. In short, I do not consider it to be in the interest of the Court nor the state generally to adopt such a radical and untested approach, one that significantly alters decades of jurisprudence both in Utah and nationally.
No journalist I know wants to facilitate crime or allow harm. But the majority draft seems to reflect an unrealistic fear that reporters spend much of their time trying to accomplish just that. The exceptions in part (d) of the majority Rule 509 draft appear so broad and speculative as to very likely swallow up the privilege itself. For example, the exception in (d)(1) refers to the planned commission of a crime or tort. This language would seem to lend itself to subjective and broad application such that the privilege would rarely be found to exist.
Further, the majority draft makes no accounting for the seriousness of the torts or crimes involved. As far as I am aware, virtually all states that apply exceptions even remotely similar to this proposal do so only in cases of serious felony crimes. Yet the proposed Utah rule conceivably would negate the reporter’s privilege in case of the most minor infraction – or even the most minor infraction that someone only has imagined. Likewise, the language in (d)(2) regarding threat of harm contains no qualification about the seriousness of the harm required. In reality, every situation in which a reporter would want to claim the privilege carries the conceivable threat of harm (not necessarily physical) to someone, or there would be no need for the privilege in the first place.
I could go on in my criticisms of the majority draft, but suffice it to say that I disagree completely with the approach taken. A much more sensible approach is the balancing test proposed in the alternative draft, which establishes a qualified privilege that can be overcome if circumstances warrant. In short, the alternative draft accounts for all the concerns and fears reflected in the majority draft’s exceptions, but without all the problems that accompany such a speculative and broad laundry list. The alternative draft also reflects decades of judicial and legislative thinking about the privilege, and thus represents a much-tested approach that has proven workable and reasonable in many different circumstances. With the alternative draft’s approach, the Court will not be revisiting this issue in a couple of years, as I fear would be the case with the majority draft approach.
I believe the news-consuming public of Utah deserves responsible and high-quality journalism. This requires a reasonable qualified privilege to protect, when circumstances warrant, confidential sources and the product of newsgathering, including unpublished and non-confidential materials.
Edward L. Carter, J.D. (ed_carter@byu.edu)
Utah State Bar #9871
Assistant professor of communications
Brigham Young University

I am not in favor of adopting the proposed text of Rule 702. I would rather see Rule 702 of the federal rules of evidence be adopted by Utah. The way Utah currently interprets Rule 702, it allows testimony regarding junk science too easily into the courtroom. I would like to see the Federal Rule adopted instead because then much of that junk science would be filtered out by the rule and only credible scientific testimony would be heard in the courtrooms.

I write to comment on the proposed changes to Rule 702, Testimony by experts.
My first concern is essentially a practical one: why must Utah have a separate jurisprudence on expert witnesses when virtually all other rules of evidence mirror the federal rules? From a practitioner’s point of view, working towards a unified approach on such basic issues as expert witnesses makes more sense than developing a divergent approach. There surely is wisdom in developing substantive rules of law that fit more precisely our local notions of justice, equity, and dispute resolution, and I do not suggest that we adopt rules of law just because other jurisdictions have them. However, keeping the rules as to what evidence is admissible and what evidence is not the same across jurisdictions seems to further the ability of the courts to fashion decisions that reach the unique merits of the cases they judge, and effect a more sound resolution of societal issues because the parties are on equal footing.
Second, I am concerned with the way subsection (c) appears to interact with subsection (b). Subsection (b) speaks in terms of sufficient reliable data applied to the facts of the case in a reliable manner. Subsection (c) then says that requirement is–not may be–met simply by showing that the expert’s approach is generally accepted in the relevant community. Thus, subsection (c) seems to eviscerate subsection (b). Wouldn’t it be better either to eliminate subsection (c) altogether, or at least to modifiy it to read: “The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) may be satisfied by demonstrating that the principles or methods on which such knowledged is based . . .” General acceptance in the relevant expert community is not the only way to establish sufficiency, reliability, and application but subsection (c) strongly suggests that it is.
Third, by making “general acceptance” in the community the manner in which subsection (b) is satisfied, subsection (c) also eliminates the real gatekeeping function of the trial judge. S/he is reduced simply to determining whether the proposed methods and opinions are generally accepted. S/he is not required to make the more difficult determination that the expert has, in fact, gathered sufficient data, used reliable methods and principles, and applied those methods and principles in a reliable manner to the facts of the case. In a very real way, subsection (c) damages the prestige of the trial judge.
One of the problems engendered by the Rimmasch/novel scientific evidence rule is that it takes the court out of the determination of what is useful evidence in all but a few cases. The federal rule 702, and the Daubert line of cases on which it is based, put the judge in control of the process, where s/he belongs. Under the Utah approach, the lawyers are in control. Clever lawyers and clever experts, rather than solid evidence, often win the day.
As our society becomes more complex, and technology more advanced, there is a greater entrepreneurial attraction to the expert witness business, and a correspondingly greater need for the judge to guard against the admission into evidence of marginal “expert” testimony. The proposed amendments to rule 702 do not equip the court to perform this task.
The Advisory Committee Note makes this clear. It erects a standard of “rational skepticism”, whatever that may mean. Subsection (c) suggests that all it means is “general acceptance” in the relevant expert community. The committee note also indicates that the “rational skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on reliability”, whatever that may mean.
What the trial lawyers need, and presumably what the trial judges want, is clear guidance on what kinds of expert testimony should be admitted into evidence and what should be kept out. General acceptance by the relevant expert community is a pretty loose standard. It is this standard that led to the adoption of the Daubert line of cases and the eventual amendments to FRE 702.
The Advisory Committee note indicates, at lines 57 – 61, that “failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under section (c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible, only that the threshold showing for reliability under section (b) must be shown by other means.” However, the actual text of subsection (c) implies to the contrary. It says that the threshold “is satisifed if . . .” and does not allow for alternative means of proving up reliability, sufficiency and appropriate application.
Fourth, in my personal experience, the Daubert line of cases, and the amended FRE 702 have not resulted in a rash of motions to exclude expert witnesses. Surely such motions are filed from time to time, but they would have been filed under Rimmasch, Frye, or any other standard.
In the end, ideas such as “rational skepticism”, “any plausible evidence”, and “threshold showing” invite appeals. One can imagine, without difficulty, appellate opinions in which the high court chastises the trial court for not being skeptical enough, or for being too skeptical, or for not being sufficiently receptive to plausible evidence of reliability. One can easily imagine confused counsel and confused judges. We have enough confusion already because of the novel/non-novel dichotomy. Instead of a proliferation of motions to exclude experts, we will have a proliferation of appeals regarding whether the expert was properly excluded or not.
My suggestion is to eliminate subsection (c) from the proposed amendment. Let the trial court make the determination as to whether the expert has garnered sufficient data and whether s/he has used reliable methods to gather, evaluate and apply that data to the facts of the case. Ideally, Utah FRE 702 would track Federal FRE 702 verbatim, but if that is not possible, remove (c) from the proposed rule and leave (a) and (b) as they are.
Phillip S. Ferguson

Having Proposed URE 702 go into effect would bring our court system inline with majority of the nation as well as the federal system. It is important to ensure this type of evidence be reliable and supported by proper scientific analysis and accepted among the scientific community. This rule will also ensure that junk science is not relied upon.

Comment re: Proposed Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Creating an expert testimony gatekeeper role for Utah state trial judges is desperately needed. The current state of the law is confusing and difficult for lawyers and judges to utilize. After representing both plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury cases tried in the United States District Courts, in my experience Daubert/Khumo based challenges of expert testimony(sometimes including formal hearings with direct and cross examinations of experts) allow both sides an opportunity to efficiently test the scientific reliability of expert testimony well in advance of trial. Thus, encouraging settlement, allowing more focused trial planning and allowing these important decisions to be made in an environment conducive to the deliberate analysis required to weed out unreliable, but well-disguised opinions offered by well-trained expert witnesses. After a brief period of overuse, this process has now become an accepted, efficient and valuable aspect of federal trial practice, for both sides. The proposed rule, with one exception, should bring these benefits to Utah state courts.
Unfortunately, subparagraph c of the proposed new Utah rule is not, in my opinion, workable. Scientific reliability has at least two facets. First, the principals relied upon by the expert must be generally accepted. For this determination, the trial judge is informed by referring to the collective knowledge of the relevant scientific/expert community. For example, if the expert is relying on the second law of thermodynamics, the judge should be provided texts, peer reviewed articles, and other testimony which tends to establish or refute the general acceptance by physicists of the second law of thermodynamics. So far, so good for subparagraph c of proposed Rule 702 U.R.E.
Second, however, the trial court must determine if the general principal -the second law of thermodynamics- relied upon by the expert has been applied with sufficient scientific rigor to the facts of the case so as to render the final opinion scientifically reliable. This determination requires a case specific analysis of whether the scientfic method was carefully followed by the particular expert when testing her case specific hypothesis. Sometimes the texts and articles of similar experts might be helpful, but frequently the reason the litigation is pending at all is that the case specific technical issues haven’t been evaluated and resolved by the expert community. Therefore, though there may be general principals that can be utilized to formulate an hypothesis, there might not be a generally accepted methodology to test the hypethesis. The absence of such generally accepted testing methodology is, in such circumstances, not dispositive or even helpful regarding this second facet of scientific reliability. Furthermore, even if there is general acceptance of the particular testing methodology utilized, the expert’s opinion may still not be reliable. Methodology is reliable only in context. Just because the expert community recognizes or routinely utilizes a particular testing methodology doesn’t mean that the methodology is appropriate for the particular hypothesis offered by the expert. For example, double blind testing with placebo is a generally accepted methodology for determining the efficacy of new medicinal drugs, but the same approach isn’t used for testing new surgical instruments. Once again, general acceptance isn’t a helpful concept in determining whether the accepted methodology has been rigorously applied to a unique set of facts. The trial court must be entrusted, with appelate review, to make that determination on a case by case basis without a statement in the rule identifying what will satisfy the criteria in every case.
For these reasons, in my opinion, subparagraph c should be altered (just change “is” in line 11 to “may”) or it should be eliminated.

I think the bar and the courts would benefit from adopting the federal approach to Rule 702. Consistency between courts would be an advantage to those who practice in both. Further, we need to be careful concerning the nature and scope of expert testimony as too often you get what you pay for.

Below I have pasted another story from the Associated Press detailing a state legislature (this time, Missouri) considering passage of a reporter’s privilege bill that would essentially create a simple balancing test. Regarding the proposed Rule 509, Utah would be tying its judges’ hands by adopting such a laundry list of exceptions to the reporter’s privilege.
Instead, I believe the Court should adopt the alternative draft of Rule 509 that contains a simple balancing test that allows judges to make a determination of what is in the public interest. Instead of giving litigants a list of exceptions with which to hold a judge’s feet to the fire, the Court should simply give judges some guidance for a reasonable balancing test in the alternative draft of Rule 509.
That way judges can weigh all the interests and make a determination of what will be best, without feeling tied down to consider every exception mentioned in the Advisory Committee’s proposed majority draft of Rule 509. I believe there might be situations in which it would be proper for a judge to apply the balancing test in favor of disclosure, and that would be allowed (when the interests for disclosure are particularly strong, such as in a murder investigation in which the reporter has information not obtainable elsewhere) under the qualified privilege and balancing test in the alternative draft of Rule 509.
State shield law wins first round in Jefferson City
Disclosure would require judge’s ruling.
Published Tuesday, March 13, 2007
JEFFERSON CITY (AP) – Before reporters can be ordered to disclose their anonymous sources and turn over notes and video that hasn’t been aired, a judge first would have to decide whether it is in the public’s interest under a House bill given first-round approval Monday night.
The measure would create a reporter’s privilege, protecting unpublished work and the disclosure of confidential sources. The bill leaves it up to a judge to weigh the public’s interest in disclosing the information, any alternatives to compelling journalists to reveal their sources and the reason the information is being requested.
Rep. Tim Jones, the bill’s sponsor, said he wants to prevent law enforcement officials and prosecutors from using reporters to gather information for them. “We don’t want to encourage others to shortcut and steal from another’s work product,” said Jones, R-Eureka.
Covered under the bill would be those who earn most of their income from newsgathering or those who work for businesses that earn most of their
income from journalism. It would cover broadcast, print and electronic media. There are 31 states, plus the District of Columbia, with media shield laws in state courts. Congress has considered adding one to federal courts after several high-profile cases in which reporters faced or served jail time after refusing to reveal sources.
Rep. Jake Zimmerman, a lawyer, said he defended a St. Louis television station when it was subpoenaed by a county prosecutor’s office for information about a low-profile crime.
“The subpoena was the first thing that they thought to do,” said Zimmerman, D-Olivette. “Before they sent detectives out to
investigate, before they questioned witnesses … they sent the subpoena to the news organization and expected them to drop everything they were doing to respond to a prosecutor’s inquiry.”
….
The House must vote again on the bill before it would move to the Senate.

As president of the Utah Foundation for Open Government, a citizen coalition dedicated to preserving open government and upholding the First Amendment, my board and I have grave concerns about the proposed Rule 509.
While I applaud the committee for its efforts to provide a qualified privilege to reporters, I fear that this proposed rule will cause confusion and ultimately hurt the very people it is designed to protect, the Utah news media and their confidential sources.
The outlined exceptions to the absolute privilege seem designed to cover every possible eventuality, both real and imagined, but in effect provide very little protection for anyone, either source or reporter. They also seem to place the burden on the reporter or news gatherer to ascertain with clarity the intent of the source, in that it refers to a source who may “commit or plan to commit a crime or tort.”
This is impractical and unrealistic. Sources request confidentiality under usually trying circumstances, such as the fear of reprisal, censure or fear for their own safety. It is usually not possible for the reporter to ascertain all the information outlined in the Rule. It also places an undue burden on the reporter to act as an arm of the law, determining possible intent, action or motive, instead of simply news gathering.
The history of the U.S. is replete with instances where confidential sources provided invaluable information to reporters, from criminal activity by its own government to the perpetuation of fraud by principals of large corporations, who were then able to disseminate it to the citizens of this country. The public good has been served time and time again by the revelation of information that the parties guilty of those very crimes sought to repress.
By trying to qualify and control, the Rule nullifies the very power given to reporters — that of being able, through assurances of source confidentiality, to access information vital to the public interest.
The Rule also provides no protection for confidential unpublished news information gathered by the reporter, further tying his/her hands in executing his/her role as a watchdog of the people. Misconduct, whether by a government or individual, is rarely revealed to a reporter in a complete expose but piece by piece until the reporter can use that information to put together the story. The Rule will inhibit this process and lead to, as in the case of the Daily Herald, a policy of destroying such information after immediate use.
As a citizen coalition we respect and support the media’s role in representing us where we cannot go and in providing information valuable to us through access that we do not have.
I ask the committee to reject the proposed Rule in favor of the amended rule set forth by the minority committee members.
Sincerely,
Linda Petersen
President
Utah Foundation for Open Government
lindapetersen@gmail.com
I believe that the amended rule propsed by the minority addresses these vital issues and enables to true intent of the Rule to be

I would like to add my support of Option B of Rule 509 along with that of the Utah Attorney General and the Utah Media Coalition. I am most concerned that reporters’ notes be protected and that whistleblowers are encouraged to act.
Regards,
April B. Squires
303 A St., #503
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

As the publisher of a rural weekly newspaper based in Manti, Utah, I urge the Judicial Council to adopt the minority report regarding news reporter privilege.
The most important reason for a privilege is to create climate in which sources are willing to freely communicate public-interest information to reporters. If sources know that reporter notes, photos, tapes or direct observation of what might be criminal activity are not protected, the sources will be much more circumspect in providing information.
Believe it or not, this issue came up today, right here in Manti. One of my reporters is doing a story on meth in Sanpete County. She called to suggest we call the series “What’s cooking in your neighborhood.” I asked her what she meant by that, and she told me the drug counselor at the mental health agency told her that Sanpete County not only has meth, but has meth labs. (I didn’t know that–I thought meth was being brought into the county, but didn’t know it was being manufactured here.)
She asked how I would feel if she went “underground” and visited a meth lab to report on what goes on.
I believe a first-hand account of an evening in a meth lab might be a wake-up call for our citizens and might be a legitimate item to publish. The existence of meth labs raises not only drug abuse but also environmental issues for the broader community.
But I had to warn my reporter that if we published such a report, we could be called in for questioning and asked to reveal confidential information. If such a case went to court and we refused to answer questions, we could be subject to contempt.
Under the rule the advisory committee is proposing, I probably should squelch this story. If I do, the chilling effect of potential contempt will have fettered my first-amendment rights.
Suzanne Dean
Publisher
Sanpete Messenger

We do not live in a perfect world. News reporters provide balance and accountability to and for “the people” against unlawful secrecy and crime in our republic’s government, businesses and other organizations. Most often their sources need to be protected. However, balance is also provided through judges who must have the freedom to determine the best interests of the public vrs. “newspaper reporter privilege” on a case by case basis. I urge you to support “option B”

Utah’s rules of evidence, as well as its rules of civil procedure, should conform to the applicable federal rules. Doing so promotes consistency, efficiency and uniformity, which, in turn, saves time and cost for litigants, their counsel and the courts. Promulgating different rules, especially those with subtle, well meaning and innocent appearing differences, fosters disputes, which, in turn, increases the cost and amount of time necessary to resolve cases. The proposed change to Utah Rule of Evidence 702 is the type of subtle change from Federal Rule of Evidence 702 that is not in the best interest of Utah citizens or the courts. Precedent that has been developed under the Federal Rule will be of questionable value in interpreting the new proposed Utah Rule because of these subtle variations. Accordingly, I oppose the proposed rule change, and strongly recommend that the Court adopt a rule that mirrors the Federal Rule.

I urge adoption of alternative Rule 509. It seems sensible. Clear rules of journalistic privilege will allow robust reporting in the public interest, yet preserve logical, legal exceptions in a carefully described set of circumstances.
As an academic who prepares the next generation of Utah journalists, and as a former professional who worked for 14 years at major metro dailies, I consider 509 to be good law — not only for journalists, but for the people of Utah.

Several months ago, I wrote to comment on a proposed change to Utah’s Rule 702 that, as I recall, would have adopted its federal counterpart. I was surprised, and frankly quite disappointed, that the proposed rule change was not implemented. I am writing now to urge, once again, the adoption of the federal rule rather than the proposed amendment to Rule 702. While the proposed amendment may be an improvement over the existing rule, and the rather ambiguous jurisprudence it has spawned over the years, it is, nevertheless, an unnecessarily confusing rule that will undoubtedly result in continued inconsistent application in both the trial and appellate courts of this state. Rather than opting for the federal rule, that has been well received and followed by numerous states, and that has a well developed body of jurisprudence, you have proposed a rule that is ambiguous and will take years of litigation to sort out. The phrase “threshold showing” and subsection (c), in its entirety, are recipes for confusion rather than clarity. The parade of horribles offered by opponents to the earlier proposal to adopt the federal rule are belied by the empirical evidence developed by the federal courts. I am still awaiting some rational explanation for the apparent belief that a more lenient standard is better than the fair but rigorous rule adopted by the federal courts. The Advisory Committee Note certainly does not provide that explanation, nor does it resolve the ambiguities inherent in the proposed language of the rule.

Rule 702 Comment:
Please adopt Federal Rule 702 in its entirety.

These comments will also appear as a opinion piece in the Standard-Examiner, Ogden, Utah Monday, April 2, 2007
The recently released book, “Mayflower” which recounts the Pilgrims’ arrival in Plymouth might have had a different name if the Puritans hadn’t been duped by an unscrupulous ship captain who sold them a vessel ironically named “Speedwell.” The ship’s master, Reynolds, purposely rigged the ship’s masts, so the “excess strain opened up the seams between the planks, causing the hull to leak.” By “overmasting” the Speedwell, Reynolds had provided himself with an easy way to deceive this fanatical group of landlubbers.”
The Puritans couldn’t bail fast enough. They abandoned the ship, lost their money and eventually bought the Mayflower. The duplicitous captain slowed their voyage by more than a month at the eventual cost of many lives. Once the ship’s masts were refitted the vessel “made many voyages to the great profit of her owners.”
The Utah Supreme Court now has before its consideration Rule 509 a News Reporter’s Privilege, comparable in many ways to the “Speedwell.” From outward appearance, the rule seems sound, but, unfortunately, six exemptions create holes that effectively sink the entire thing.
Utah is just one of three states in the nation currently operating without any protection whatsoever for reporters’ sources or information. For the past year and a half the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence has looked at how the judicial branch should handle reporters’ information.
Following their work, the committee ostensibly created an absolute privilege for reporters, which would protect journalists from revealing sources or information to anyone at anytime, including the courts. However the committee then “overmasted” the privilege and opened up the seams between the planks with sweeping exemptions, notably a lack of protection for unpublished, non-confidential material and sources, and no protection for information that a prosecutor claims may be “classified” or “protected” by the government.
Abraham Lincoln said, “Let the country know the facts, and the nation will be safe.” And many important facts have been learned using documents the government would have preferred remained classified.
“We know about prisons that have been maintained in the name of our government around the world, and found out about it thanks to journalists at the Washington Post and the New York Times,” said the national president of the Society of Professional Journalists, Christine Tatum, who visited Utah recently. “When we understand a little bit more about the handling of certain records, wiretapping, banking analysis, firing of prosecutors, when we stop to think about all the things that are happening, we know there are facts that need to be known and people are risking a lot to be able to share them and publicize them for the health of our democracy.”
Rule 509 doesn’t just deal with publicized material, however, under the exemptions unpublished material is fair game for prosecutors, including video outtakes, transcripts of conversations, reporters’ phone logs and e-mails.
“It’s such an imprecise request to say, ‘I want all of your notes about XYZ’ because there’s so much information in my notes,” Tatum said. “I can think of many times when it was not germane to my story that a source was struggling with alcoholism or depression. That doesn’t mean the information isn’t sitting in my notebook. Once my notes go into the public record, there’s nothing I can do to save a person from public embarrassment. If people don’t perceive a journalist as a secret keeper as a holder of confidence, the freeze on our conversations would be immediate.”
Most journalists in Utah support a proposal set forth by a minority on the judiciary committee. This proposal supports a balancing test outlined in 1972 by the Supreme Court and allows a judge to determine what a reporter must reveal. Using the test, the judge considers whether the material could be obtained elsewhere, whether it the information is central to the case and whether it would be admissible in a court of law.
“If a prosecutor can’t meet the balancing test, the material is protected, reporters don’t have to turn it over,” said Jeff Hunt, who represents Utah media on this issue. “You don’t want to give anybody with subpoena power the ability to just troll through your files whenever they think it would be an easy way to get information to help them in their case.”
The Puritans didn’t let a leaky hull stop them in their quest to sail to a new land ripe with the promise of prosperity and civil liberties; reporters too, will continue their quest to provide the information necessary for a free and unfettered exchange of ideas, but for both groups it’s a much easier voyage without a leaky hull.

The Salt Lake Tribune published my op-ed piece on March 27 urging the Court to adopt the alternative draft of Rule 509:
http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_5526539
The piece acknowledges the maxim that “[t]he public has a claim to every man’s evidence” and yet the Rules of Evidence already include privileges for spouses, physicians, mental health therapists, government informers and individuals who order environmental self-audits. The reporter’s privilege is in line with those privileges and would result in clarity for journalists, their sources and parties interested in seeking information from journalists.
The piece argues that the alternative draft of Rule 509 better accomplishes the important public policies behind the reporter’s privilege, which is in place in the overwhelming majority of states in either statutory, evidentiary or precedential form.

Rule 702
The recommendation that Utah adopt it’s own Rule 702 is well taken. The annotation on Federal Rule 702 comprises more than 300 pages. In other words, you can find a case to support any position you wish on Federal Rule 702. Some have found the Rimmasch analysis unworkable. The current proposal gives a clean sweep. It focuses on proper foundation for expert witnesses without inviting the many hearings Federal Rule 702 invariably brings.
The court should adopt the proposed Rule 702.

Rule 509
The advisory committee, and particularly the Rule 509 subcommittee, spend innumerable hours over many months considering all the options on a reporter’s privilege rule. All stake holders were invited to attend and state their case. The committee’s proposal is the best choice. Utah could do nothing and leave all concerned without definitive guidance. That is not a good choice. We could also adopt the “minority report” rule but that is not a good choice either.
While the press does enjoy a unique position under the First Amendment that position should be supported by an appropriate rule only to the extent First Amendment rights are involved. The minority rule would give the press rights based on business interests rather than free speech interests. The committee recommendation protects the press to the extent necessary to allow the news to be reported without infringing on the rights of the rest of the people.
The court should adopt the committee’s recommended Rule 509.

I generally support proposed rule 702. I prefer its approach to that of federal rule 702. I think it provides a more flexible and fact-sensitive approach than the federal rule and better implements the spirit of the Rimmasch and Daubert lines of cases, which were meant to emphasize the court’s gate-keeper role, not to make the court a roadblock to the admission of scientific evidence that may not have reached the level of general acceptance. In close cases, I trust juries to be able to distinguish between valid and bogus expert testimony.
I also think that Utah should not blindly follow the federal rules lockstep.
However, I agree with some of the comments that have been posted about subsection (c). I think the intent is to allow a party to meet its burden under subsection (b) by showing that the principles, methods, and data have been generally accepted in the relevant community. But I’m not sure the proposed rule as written does that. Specifically, I’m not sure how “general acceptance” relates to subsections (b)(ii) and (iii). I think it would be the rare case where the relevant scientific or other expert community has reviewed and accepted not only the reliability of an expert’s principles and methods but also the sufficiency of the facts and data he or she relied on in a particular case and his or her application of the principles or methods to those facts or data. What role should general acceptance play where one or two of the three subparagraph (b) criteria have been generally accepted, but not all of them? I think I would prefer to see subsection (c) revised to say that the court may take into account general acceptance in the relevant expert community in determining whether the threshold showing under subparagraph (b) has been met, rather than making it seem an all-or-nothing proposition, as the current subsection (c) seems to do.

I am in favor of adopting the proposed URE 702. I actually respect the Utah case law that has developed in this area, and I feel that Utah’s rule provides a more sensible manner of finding the truth and promoting juducial economy than FRE 702.

As the comments supporting adoption of federal Rule 702 seem adequately discussed by retired Justice Zimmerman and Judge Kay, may I just note my complete agreement with their comments.

As a news reporter, I support the creation of a privilege for news reporters in Utah courts, largely because of an experience five years ago when my notes were subpoenaed by the Wasatch County Attorney.
The country attorney apparently thought my notes would help him in his case against Mazhar Tabesh, a Heber City motel owner ultimately convicted of setting fire to part of the motel.
However, in interviews with me, Tabesh insisted he did not start the fire; and rather was the victim of a hate crime for his Pakistani and Muslim background. I had reported as much, which is what I suppose piqued the interest of the county attorney.
After receiving the subpoena, my editor told me not to throw away any hand-written notes or delete any typed notes on my computer. But I had thrown away most of my notes (I typically throw out notes a day or two after a story is published), except for a piece of paper on which I had scribbled some important phone numbers and a couple quotes that I did not want to lose.
I believe the subpoena served as a muzzle. I did not want to interview Mr. Tabesh after the prosecutor subpoenaed me (and I never did talk to him again) for fear that the prosecutor would try to seize future interview notes, or that I would be found in contempt of court.
A reporter’s privilege will give us some measure of assurance, as we go about our jobs, that our work will be protected.
Thank you for considering it.

I urge retention of the current Utah Rule 402, and the body of common law developed in accordance therewith, although I believe the proposed modification submitted for comment to be superior to Federal Rule 402.
Not surprisingly, our respected Defense Bar has weighed-in heavily, for the third time in seven years, campaigning to mandate application of the Federal Daubert motion/briefing/hearing process
to every expert witness, no matter how mainstream or qualified, in every case; including every treating doctor in every garden-variety personal injury case. What a field day for defense motion practice. It is hard to imagine a more subtle, divisive, fee-generating, expert-alienating way of prolonging the course of litigation, over-burdening our state’s judicial resources, diminishing the people’s access to the judicial remedies, and diluting the juror’s role in weighing the evidence.
The current rule’s “novel scientific principles or techniques” distinction has proven to be a relatively simple and adequate evidentiary qualifier, as the Utah Supreme Court effectively demonstrated in Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P2d 1193 (Ut 1999). If we now abandon that distinction, we will be stuck using the same unwieldy sledge-hammer(Daubert) to drive spikes and thumbtacks.
The last thing needed in the administration of justice in our state courtrooms is a new layer of complexity surrounding the preparation and presentation of routine expert testimony.
Until those urging a change can demonstrate that the current Rule 402 is broken, please continue resisting the one-sided campaign to fix it.
Thank you for your service,
Scott D. Brown

Re: Rule 702 – As drafted, proposed Rule 702 represents a significant step toward the development of state evidentiary law, as opposed to blind adoption of federal interpretations. Because appellate courts review a trial court’s 702 rulings on an abuse of discretion standard, reliance on the federal rule and federal authorities interpreting that rule stunts any real growth of Utah’s evidentiary jurisprudence. Specifically, a trial court presented with Rule 702 challenge may pick and choose among innumerable and often conflicting federal decisions applying Fed. R. Evid. 702. Under an abuse of discretion standard, little opportunity exists for the either the Utah Court of Appeals or Utah Supreme Court to guide application of the rule.
Proposed Utah R. Evid. 702 also represents a reasoned and well-balanced approach toward the weight vs. admissibility issues involved in 702. The proposed rule relieves trial courts of the potential burdens which inevitably arise under a barrage of Daubert pretrial hearings, hearings which often turn into mini-trials themselves, needlessly increasing the costs of litigation. If the comments to 702 mean anything when applying Utah’s new Rule 702, then there should be no excuse from either side of the bar for complaint.
Finally, the comments and the Rule itself go a long way toward clearing up any alleged lack of clarity between Rimmasch and Clayton, properly placing the decision in the hands of the fact-finder for determining whether the expert’s testimony, though admissible, carries sufficient weight to satisfy or assist in reaching the relevant burden of proof.
Accordingly, proposed Utah R. Evid. 702 should be adopted.
Peter W. Summerill
Hasenyager & Summerill

Re: Rule 702 – As drafted, proposed Rule 702 represents a significant step toward the development of state evidentiary law, as opposed to blind adoption of federal interpretations. Because appellate courts review a trial court’s 702 rulings on an abuse of discretion standard, reliance on the federal rule and federal authorities interpreting that rule stunts any real growth of Utah’s evidentiary jurisprudence. Specifically, a trial court presented with Rule 702 challenge may pick and choose among innumerable and often conflicting federal decisions applying Fed. R. Evid. 702. Under an abuse of discretion standard, little opportunity exists for the either the Utah Court of Appeals or Utah Supreme Court to guide application of the rule.
Proposed Utah R. Evid. 702 also represents a reasoned and well-balanced approach toward the weight vs. admissibility issues involved in 702. The proposed rule relieves trial courts of the potential burdens which inevitably arise under a barrage of Daubert pretrial hearings, hearings which often turn into mini-trials themselves, needlessly increasing the costs of litigation. If the comments to 702 mean anything when applying Utah’s new Rule 702, then there should be no excuse from either side of the bar for complaint.
Finally, the comments and the Rule itself go a long way toward clearing up any alleged lack of clarity between Rimmasch and Clayton, properly placing the decision in the hands of the fact-finder for determining whether the expert’s testimony, though reliable, carries sufficient weight to satisfy or assist in reaching the relevant burden of proof.
Accordingly, proposed Utah R. Evid. 702 should be adopted.
Peter W. Summerill
Hasenyager & Summerill

The proposed amendment to Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence, with the proposed commentary, is unnecessary and will add a mountain of uncertainty to how and under what conditions opinion testimony will be admissible in evidence. A word search of “rational skepticism” does not lead to any definitions. Therefore, until defined by Utah’s appelate courts, lawyers and judges in Utah courtrooms will be feeling their way along without any light to guide them. This will lead to many appeals and, worse, to trial court decisions that are contrary to what the appellate courts ultimately decide the law to be, in cases where the economic value prevents appeal.
The average citizen-litigant will pay a steep price for the proposed amendment, either in the cost of the appeal and re-trial of their cases or in being forced by economics to submit to a decision, contrary to the law as ultimately determined by appellate case law, for which there is no economic ability to appeal. The cost to the judiciary in loss of public confidence will be steep indeed.
Rule 702 has a rich, well reasoned line of cases in Utah, starting with Rimmash, which allows litigators and judges alike to have reasonalbe predictability in this area of the Rules of Evidence, all of which will be loss by the proposed amendment.
Thank you, Thomas W. Seiler

Re: Rule 702 – Proposed Changes – Opposed
* Waste of Attorney Time
* Draining Judicial Resources
Dear Mr. Shea:
I would like to weigh in on the matter of proposed changes to Rule 702, which would sup- posedly result in the adoption of the federal Daubert Rule in the state courts of Utah. I am opposed to these changes because I believe that it will result in a waste of time for counsel and a squandering of the limited resources of state court judges (who have very limited access to law clerks). The reasons for my opposition can be summed up in recounting the facts from a hearing in April, 2005, but which is typical of other cases in principle. My client had been a donor at a Red Cross Blood Center a few years ago. After giving blood, she told the phlebotomist that she felt dizzy and sick, after which the phlebotomist allegedly told her to get up and walk over and partake of some juice and cookies and she would feel better. She got up and started to walk over, at which time she fell and struck her head, re- sulting in a mild traumatic closed head brain injury (MTBI).
The client secured medical help long before she retained our office. She consulted with one family practice doctor who also happened to be a professor at the University of Utah in sports medicine, and who had lengthy experience in treating closed head brain injuries because of her sports medicine background. The client visit- ed this doctor about 20 times over an 18-month period. The doctor diagnosed her as having sus- tained an MTBI, and this diagnosis remained throughout the treatment.
By federal statute, all cases against the Red Cross are heard in federal court. As trial approached, the defense made a motion to strike the family practice doctor as a treating expert witness on Daubert grounds, i.e., that her opinion was allegedly not based upon research and other such matters commonly raised in a Daubert hearing. Were such a witness excluded, the case would be virtually be unprovable for the plaintiff.
The case had been marginally worked up by one of my associates, but I was to argue the motion. It had been a long time since I had dealt with this kind of a Daubert challenge, since most of our personal injury cases are in state court. This kind of a motion would not have had, pardon the expression, “a snowball’s chance in hell” in state court, because the only question would have been, really, is the treating doctor’s testimony relevant and helpful to the jury? Instead, we had a serious challenge to a long-established treating doctor who had excel- lent credentials.
The night before the hearing, I spent many hours, and was up virtually all night, work- ing on this issue to get prepared to argue it in front of Judge Ted Stewart. Of course, Stewart has two law clerks. His preparation and knowledge of the cases was obviously significant. The hear- ing took almost two hours, as this was a very serious attempt to exclude an important witness. In the end, the judge ruled from the Bench and denied the motion, and the matter was set for trial.
I do not know how much time the defense put in on this matter, but counsel wrote a very lengthy brief citing a couple of dozen cases and discussing several of them extensively. We did likewise, and attached many exhibits. I estimate that my total time in preparing to argue this motion, not to mention that of my associate, was easily 20 hours. Had the matter been in state court, I doubt that the defense counsel would have ever brought the motion. I suspect that Judge Stewart spent somewhere between four and six hours in reading the lengthy memoranda. His clerk probably spent at least triple that time doing her preparation.
In the last analysis, I pointed out to Judge Stewart that if Daubert is interpreted to mean that treating doctors should somehow be ex- cluded, then we have come a long, sad way down the road of illogical conclusions. On final analysis, Judge Stewart accepted this argument, but not until after an enormous amount of wasted time and effort. Such a motion never should have been brought, because a treating doctor with an extensive record of visits should never be ex- cluded from giving his/her expert opinion on the nature of a malady and its cause. However, this is exactly what defense counsel tried to do.
If Rule 702 is amended to adopt the federal Daubert approach, it will cause many such needless and wasteful motions to be brought by defense counsel. The temptation will be too great for many counsel to resist. These motions will be brought not only by defense counsel, who will view them as a legitimate effort on behalf of their clients (and a magnificent billing oppor- tunity as well), but also by plaintiff’s counsel. Judges will be constantly peppered with these types of motions, many of which are brought simply to harass and overwhelm the other side. The granting of these motions will prompt numer- ous appeals by the parties. The current interpretation of Rule 702 has worked very well. There are times when expert witnesses are and should be excluded. However, these instances are, and should be, rare. Juries are fully capable of making decisions about the credibility of experts. In my opinion and experience, Daubert challenges to expert witnesses are largely tactical, seldom valid, often brought to obtain unfair advantage, and usually not otherwise well taken. The adoption of the proposed changes will result in an enormous waste of judicial and attor-ney resources for many years. Attorneys will waste enormous amounts of time making and respond-ing to the motions, and state court judges do not have the clerking resources or time to give them proper attention. We urge the Supreme Court to reject these proposed changes.
Very truly yours,
Robert B. Sykes
Posted by Robert Sykes March 28, 2007 18:55 hours
Robert B. Sykes, Esq.
Robert B. Sykes & Associates, P.C.
311 South State Street Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2320
[o] 801-533-0222 [f] 801-533-8081
[h] 801-531-7730 [c] 801-580-5599
email: bob@sykesinjurylaw.com
[Practice concentrating in Personal
Injury, Medical Malpractice, Product
Liability, Brain & Spinal Cord Injury,
and Civil Rights Litigation]
“Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and that write grievousness which they have prescribed; To turn aside the needy from judgment, and to take away the right from the poor of my people, that widows may be their prey, and that they may rob the fatherless!”
Isaiah 10:1-2.