Civil Jury Instructions – Assault, Battery, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution – Comment Period Expires June 13, 2025

The following new instructions have been published:

Please reference the instruction(s) in your comments. Although the comment period runs through June 13, 2025, the instructions are ready for use. The Model Civil Jury Instructions Committee will consider all comments made during the comment period and may revise the instructions as appropriate. To view all MUJI Civil instructions please visit the MUJI website – here.

The Judicial Council also encourages judges and practitioners to continuously share their experiences using any of the published instructions with the Model Civil Jury Instructions Committee. To view the Committee’s work please visit the MUJI Civil Committee website – here.

This entry was posted in Civil, Assault, Civil, Battery, Civil, Civil, False Imprisonment, Civil, Malicious Prosecution.

Dallas Young

April 29, 2025 at 11:56 am

Re: CV1730:
(1) A citizen doesn’t have authority to begin or continue criminal proceedings. Only a prosecutor can do that. This needs to be re-worded. I’ve suggested some alternate language in my comment to CV1731(3)

(3) Use of “bringing a criminal to justice” is unduly inflammatory and inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof. Why not use something like, “[name of defendant]’s primary motivation was something other than securing the prosecution of an offense.”

(4) is also problematic from a pragmatic standpoint. A verdict of acquittal isn’t a finding of innocence (in theory, anyway). There is no vehicle in a criminal case to have someone declared factually innocent. Plus, that’s not at all how that element is phrased in the Restatements (as quoted in Neff ¶ 52, anyway). As I read Neff, this proposed statement of the element is not a correct statement of the law. -Although I will give you that the court in Neff could have been more careful to distinguish between a criminal case ending in a defendant’s favor and actual innocence. It might be worth consulting cases involving indemnity for accused public employees. I litigated this several years ago and while I think the Utah cases addressing the statute (Acor v. SLC School District, 2011 UT 8, Olsen v. Eagle Mt. City, 2011 UT 10, Christensen v. Juab School Dist., 2017 UT 47, for example) didn’t reach this issue, there are other jurisdictions where there has been litigation over what constitutes a disposition favorable to the defendant. There’s also discussion in attorney’s fee cases over who is the prevailing party. Those all seem to capture the essence of what’s in play here and might have helpful language.

Re: C1731: That isn’t the probable cause standard. Why strike out on your own in how to formulate it? There’s a well-worn definition in criminal cases in the preliminary hearing context. E.g., State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 18. Seems like re-inventing the wheel here is a bad idea. Just use the formulation that’s used every day in criminal cases.

(3) needs a little re-wording because a citizen can’t begin or continue a criminal proceeding. It’d be better to refer to it as procuring a prosecution. Or maybe refer to it as “make a request to law enforcement or a prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings.” Something along those lines.

One thought on “Civil Jury Instructions – Assault, Battery, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution – Comment Period Expires June 13, 2025”

Dallas Young

April 29, 2025 at 11:56 am

Re: CV1730:
(1) A citizen doesn’t have authority to begin or continue criminal proceedings. Only a prosecutor can do that. This needs to be re-worded. I’ve suggested some alternate language in my comment to CV1731(3)

(3) Use of “bringing a criminal to justice” is unduly inflammatory and inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof. Why not use something like, “[name of defendant]’s primary motivation was something other than securing the prosecution of an offense.”

(4) is also problematic from a pragmatic standpoint. A verdict of acquittal isn’t a finding of innocence (in theory, anyway). There is no vehicle in a criminal case to have someone declared factually innocent. Plus, that’s not at all how that element is phrased in the Restatements (as quoted in Neff ¶ 52, anyway). As I read Neff, this proposed statement of the element is not a correct statement of the law. -Although I will give you that the court in Neff could have been more careful to distinguish between a criminal case ending in a defendant’s favor and actual innocence. It might be worth consulting cases involving indemnity for accused public employees. I litigated this several years ago and while I think the Utah cases addressing the statute (Acor v. SLC School District, 2011 UT 8, Olsen v. Eagle Mt. City, 2011 UT 10, Christensen v. Juab School Dist., 2017 UT 47, for example) didn’t reach this issue, there are other jurisdictions where there has been litigation over what constitutes a disposition favorable to the defendant. There’s also discussion in attorney’s fee cases over who is the prevailing party. Those all seem to capture the essence of what’s in play here and might have helpful language.

Re: C1731: That isn’t the probable cause standard. Why strike out on your own in how to formulate it? There’s a well-worn definition in criminal cases in the preliminary hearing context. E.g., State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 18. Seems like re-inventing the wheel here is a bad idea. Just use the formulation that’s used every day in criminal cases.

(3) needs a little re-wording because a citizen can’t begin or continue a criminal proceeding. It’d be better to refer to it as procuring a prosecution. Or maybe refer to it as “make a request to law enforcement or a prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings.” Something along those lines.